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On ‘domestic’ law and the law of human rights: Osborn v The Parole Board 
 
One consequence of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has been the partial displacement of the 
common law grounds of judicial review from their prior position at the front and centre of the public law 
stage. 1  Nowadays, cases are brought and judgments handed down almost entirely on human rights 
grounds, with the relevant common law principles invoked secondarily, if present at all. As such, it might 
be thought that the relatively aggressive development undergone by the common law principles of review 
throughout the 1990s had gone to waste. 2  If this has been true, it should no longer be. In Osborn v The 
Parole Board,3 the Supreme Court took the opportunity not only to clarify one facet of those common law 
rules (the circumstances in which procedural fairness requires that an individual be afforded an oral 
hearing) but also the relationship between the common law and the law of human rights under the HRA. 
The effect of this (re)consideration will be to return the common law grounds of review to their rightful 
place at centre stage and in doing so, perhaps, safeguard the future of the system of human rights 
protection which has in recent years obscured them. It is fitting that it is in the field of prisoners’ rights -
cases dealing with which had been the site of some of the most assertive pre-HRA decisions4 - that this 
reappraisal has been made. 
 
The three applicants here were each the subject of a decision by the Parole Board. Two were prisoners 
serving indeterminate sentences whose minimum terms had expired; the third was a determinate sentence 
prisoner who had been released on licence and recalled. In each case, the applicant had been denied an 
oral hearing. James Reilly, one of the indeterminate sentence prisoners, had made successful claims at 
common law and under the HRA, 5 but the decision on both points had been reversed on appeal.6 The 
other applicants had been unsuccessful both at first instance and on appeal. 
 
The issue of whether subjects of a decision have the right to an oral hearing is one aspect of the general 
requirement of procedural fairness. Oral hearings are not, as a rule, a necessary feature of fair decision-
making; they are not “the very pith of the administration of natural justice.”7 This approach has seen oral 
hearings denied even in circumstances where the consequences of the decision for the individuals who 
were the subject of it were relatively severe.8 Fairness will require oral hearings most often when the 
decision-maker must decide a disputed issue of fact relevant to its decision, but the courts have frequently 
                                                          
1 This is in keeping with the sense of the HRA as having effected a “shift in gear” in the ongoing transformation of 
UK public law by human rights principles: Tom Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act, (Hart Publishing, 
2010) 1. See also Tom Poole, ‘The Reformation of English Administrative Law’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 142, 
145 suggesting that the HRA facilitated a “deep, structural” change; that it “squared the circle between the desire for 
a more upfront application of substantive judicial review and the constitutional need for Parliament to sanction such 
a development.” 
2 R v SSHD, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198, [1993] 3 WLR 1125; R v SSHD, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, [1997] 3 
WLR 492; R v SSHD, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, [1999] 3 WLR 328; R v SSHD, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26. 
3 [2013] UKSC 61. 
4 Each of the cases referred to in note 2, above, relates to the rights of prisoners. 
5 [2010] NIQB 46. 
6 [2011] NICA 6; [2012] N.I. 38. 
7 R v Local Government Board, ex parte Arlidge [1914] 1 KB 160, 192-3, cited with approval by Wolf LJ in Lloyd v 
McMahon [1987] 1 AC 625, at 670. 
8 Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 1 AC 625. 
been more generous when deciding whether prisoners have a right to an oral hearing before the Parole 
Board. The need to assess risk, alongside the potential for explaining away even facts which were not in 
dispute, had for example seen a hearing granted to a life sentence prisoner whose parole had been 
revoked in the last case of this sort to be decided by the highest court.9  
 
In deciding the present case, Lord Reed (with whom the other four members of the court agreed) 
clarified three important points regarding procedural fairness in general. First, he confirmed that a court 
deciding such a question must decide for itself if the procedure employed was fair; contrary to what had 
been said in relation to two of these three applicants, it was not sufficient to examine the reasonableness 
of the original decisions as to what fairness required according to the Wednesbury standard.10 Second, the 
purpose of a fair procedure is not merely to assist a primary decision-maker in arriving at the ‘correct’ 
conclusion: such a procedure also promotes the dignity of those whose interests are at stake by permitting 
them to participate. This would seem to counsel against any complacent argument that a fair process need 
not have been employed because to do so would have made no difference to the outcome. Third, 
procedural fairness buttresses the rule of law by helping to ensure congruence between legal rules and the 
decisions of those bound by them, and may in fact save money in the long run where it leads to better 
decision making - the assumption that not providing a hearing is therefore the cheaper option is not only 
an illegitimate ground for refusing a hearing, but does not in fact hold.11  
 
Beyond this clarification, however, Lord Reed was content to follow the approach of the House of Lords 
in R (West) v Parole Board12 where it was held that an oral hearing is necessary where there are facts in 
dispute but also in a range of other circumstances. Importantly, Lord Hope had therein emphasised that 
one cannot be certain if a disputed issue of fact will prove determinative at the point at which one is 
deciding whether or not to grant a hearing: the question is therefore not whether the decision does in fact 
turn on the disputed issue of fact, but whether it is likely to do so.13 Following the decision in West, the 
Parole Board initially adopted a policy of granting a hearing to any recalled prisoner who requested one: 
this initial generosity was undone by a 2007 rule change which attempted to limit the availability of oral 
hearings to those who were unambiguously required to have them by the terms of the decision in West.14 
Both the decision in West and Lord Reed's clarifications feed into in the guidance offered in Osborn as to 
when procedural fairness will require an oral hearing in the context of applications for release or transfer 
to open conditions. Though explicitly non-exhaustive, the guidance is extensive and any future 
considerations of the question will certainly start, and most likely end as well, with this careful 
enumeration of possible scenarios and relevant factors. As if to emphasise this, Lord Reed places a 
summary of this same guidance at the opening of his judgment. The starting point is the rule that an oral 
hearing should be held “whenever fairness to the prisoner requires such a hearing in the light of the facts 
of the case and the importance of what is at stake.”15 Relevant to the question will be the existence of a 
factual dispute or an attempted mitigation which must be heard orally to be judged; the need for an oral 
                                                          
9 R (West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 350, at [35]. 
10 [65]. 
11 [64]-[72]. 
12 [2005] UKHL 1; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 350. 
13 [67]-[68]. 
14 Osborn, at [14]. 
15 [81] 
hearing in order to assess risk; or, if to ratify the paper decision would be unfair in light of representations 
made.16  Applied to the three cases at issue here, the guidance leads to a holding that the requirements of 
procedural fairness were not met.17 The attempt by the Parole Board to scale back the availability of oral 
hearings to the minimum explicitly required by West had therefore led it to act in a procedurally unfair 
manner. As such, in future the Parole Board would be advised to err on the side of caution when deciding 
whether or not to grant a hearing - the on-going evolution of the common law makes adherence to the 
lowest common denominator inherently problematic. 
 
Only having made this finding does Lord Reed turn to the issue upon which the applicants placed the 
emphasis of their submissions: the question of the compatibility of the refusal of oral hearings with article 
5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), made relevant by the s.6(1) HRA 
requirement that public authorities do not act incompatibly with the Convention rights. In West, 18 Lord 
Bingham had concluded that a Parole Board process conducted in conformity with common law fairness 
would meet the requirement, found in article 5(4), that an individual deprived of liberty be “entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” On review of relevant authority - Hussain v United 
Kingdom, 19 dealing specifically with a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence whose tariff had expired 
- Lord Reed concluded that, in light of the importance of what is at stake and the need to assess 
dangerousness in order to make a decision, article 5(4) will usually require that indeterminate sentence 
prisoners who have served their minimum terms are permitted an oral hearing. The failure to provide one 
meant that the present claims also succeeded to the extent that they were brought on human rights 
grounds.  
 
Lord Reed’s closing proposition on this point seems, however, problematic. He suggests that because the 
board “failed in its duty of procedural fairness to the appellants at common law, it follows that it also 
failed to act compatibly with article 5(4).”20 Understood as an addendum to what had come before, this is 
correct: the common law requires a hearing, as does article 5(4) - having breached the common law rule in 
refusing to provide one, the Parole Board has by definition also violated the applicants’ Convention rights. 
If, however, it is understood as a more general proposition as to the relationship between the two legal 
rules, it would seem to suggest that the common law does not and will not impose more stringent limits 
than the Convention rights. Such a position would be unfortunate: the common law can and should, 
where appropriate, impose limits beyond those of the ECHR. Not least because to do so is to disrupt the 
cheap but tempting moral heuristic that assesses an action as acceptable, or even ‘good’, merely because it 
does not violate the Convention rights. The possibility should therefore be explicitly left open. 
  
Osborn has an inherent importance deriving from its status as one of the relatively infrequent 
administrative law cases raising issues of common law grounds of review to arrive in the Supreme Court, 
magnified by the careful guidance on the specific issue of fairness and oral hearings in this context. 
Though limited to a context - prisoners’ rights - in which the courts have for several decades been 
concerned to ensure the common law is at its most robust, it will likely also prove influential outside of 
                                                          
16 [82]-[96], summarised at [2]. 
17 [97]-[100] 
18 [37] 
19 (1996) 22 EHRR 1 
20 [113] 
that context. The case has significance beyond the topic of procedural fairness, however, due to Lord 
Reed’s account of the relationship between domestic law and the scheme of human rights protection 
under the HRA and the ECHR. 21  Early scholarship on the HRA devotes considerable energy to the 
question of whether the act creates new domestic law remedies for breach of the (international) 
Convention rights or institutes a body of new domestic law rights. This question derives importance from 
the minimalism of the s.2 HRA “take into account” requirement and the Ullah (sometimes ‘mirror’) 
principle by which the courts have come to exercise their discretion in fulfilling that duty.22 Here, Lord 
Reed is clear and strident. Convention rights, he notes, are formulated at a high level of generality and can 
by definition only be secured by a much more detailed body of domestic law. 23  Being so under-
determined as to be incapable of guiding the conduct of individuals, the ECHR “cannot… be treated as if 
it were Moses and the prophets.”24 The first question to be answered therefore, in any case potentially 
raising human rights issues, is whether or not the relevant domestic (non-human rights) law has been 
complied with. For this reason, applicants who skip immediately to the Convention rights (as many, 
including Osborn, do) neglect the remedies with which domestic law might furnish them. This neglect 
contributes to the delegitimation of the common law rules, particularly as compared to the human rights 
law which is thereby given undue prominence. Only where the domestic law fails to “reflect fully the 
requirements of the Convention” - where it has been complied with and yet there is nevertheless a 
violation of the Convention rights - need anything further be done.25 Even here we do not immediately 
turn to the HRA: it may still be possible for the common law to be developed in a fashion which enables 
it to secure the Convention rights, as was done with growing frequency and confidence in the years 
immediately prior to incorporation. Only in those cases where this cannot be done must we look to the 
specific guarantees found in the HRA.  
 
The effect of this account is to suggest that many cases argued under the HRA should instead be 
advanced in the first place on common law grounds: Lord Reed provides a series of examples of where 
this approach has been taken and been successful – amongst them R v SSHD, ex parte Daly,26 A (No.2)27 - 
to which one might add the decision in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No. 2).28 In approaching the issue as 
they did - i.e., by instead starting from the HRA - the applicants here have acted as though, because the 
Convention is relevant to their cases, “analysis of their problem should begin and end with the Strasbourg 
case law.”29 But, in fact, this misunderstands the relationship between domestic and human rights law 
over which commentators have quarrelled: the rights are not merely an aspect of domestic law, but one 
which rather than being closed off and separate, seeps into the common law and so at times ensures the 
                                                          
21 This opposition between ‘domestic law’ and the HRA/ECHR is problematic in light of the fact that the regardless 
of the specific status of the Convention rights, the HRA is unambiguously an aspect of domestic law. In fact, it 
contributes to exactly the sort of impression Lord Reed desires to counter. It is, however, the terminology employed 
in Osborn, and so it is adopted here. 
22 R.(on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 A.C. 323, at [20]. 
23 [55]. 
24 [56]. 
25 [57]. 
26 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 A.C. 532. 
27 [2005] UKHL 71; [2006] 2 A.C. 221. 
28 [2013] UKSC 39; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 179. 
29 [63]. 
validity of those norms with the Convention rights without the latter having to be explicitly invoked. Lord 
Reed quotes Lord Justice-General Rodger: the rights “soak through and permeate the areas of our law to 
which they apply.”30 To comply with the Convention rights, therefore, it will often, and perhaps more 
often than not, be sufficient to adhere to the rules of the common law, whose existence in domestic law 
predates and survives the HRA. 
 
These remarks are of the highest importance, calculated in the first place to bring the less glamorous 
aspects of domestic administrative law back to prominence in the appeal courts. They are not, though, 
made in a vacuum. The image problem of existing human rights law (by which its critics usually mean the 
HRA) is, in no small part, attributable to the perception that it is something ‘foreign’ - not merely separate 
from but in active and frequent conflict with domestic traditions. It is for this reason that much of the 
talk about reforming the system of rights protection amounts to little more than a rebranding exercise; 
slapping the label ‘British’ on a rejigged HRA, perhaps alongside a reduction of the level of protection 
offered to foreign nationals and other supposed ‘undesirables’. This (dangerous) impression is only 
bolstered by legal argument which implicitly accepts the opposition between domestic law and the 
seemingly ‘exceptional’ Convention rights, with the first question asked being whether the former is 
compatible with the latter. As Lord Reed’s examples suggest, domestic law will frequently provide a 
rights-compliant outcome - if it does not do so more often, the fault may lie with those who look past it 
in their haste to advance a case based on the ECHR and in doing so deny the common law the 
opportunity to evolve to meet their requirements. If the Convention rights were instead held in reserve 
for cases where there remains an incompatibility even after the relevant domestic law has been identified 
and applied, then the common law grounds of review would regain their rightful place and governments 
faced with a decision they disliked required to squarely confront the issue rather than attributing it to 
some malign external influence. Not all cases would be resolvable on this basis alone, but more than 
might be imagined. The common law, Lord Reed suggests, 31 was not placed in stasis in 1998: it continues 
to develop alongside the new rules then introduced, and there is no reason to believe that it should have 
developed any less quickly and dramatically than it did throughout the 1990s - in fact, the opposite seems 
more likely, given that “the Act provides a number of additional tools enabling the courts and 
government to develop the law when necessary to fulfil those guarantees” which the Convention rights 
provide.32 
 
Lord Reed’s approach to the issue is therefore clear and admirable, calculate to achieve the fullest possible 
protection of human rights while maximising esteem for the domestic law and the remedies it (already) 
provides. The difficulty it raises is not to be found in its own terms, but in the contrast it provides with 
previous dicta, some of them of considerable authority, regarding the common law’s relationship to 
human rights law. Lord Bingham, for example, once suggested that the enactment of the HRA can be 
taken to suggest that “Parliament intended infringements of the core human (and constitutional) rights to 
be remedied under it and not by development of parallel remedies [at common law],”33 endorsing a 
position diametrically opposed to that taken by Lord Reed here. But if Lord Reed’s approach is new to 
the Supreme Court, it is not new to Lord Reed himself, who has often championed a distinctive approach 
to this question. In a speech to the Scottish Public Law Group in 2011, he argued that the domestic law 
                                                          
30 HM Advocate v Montgomery 2000 JC 111, 117, quoted at [63]. 
31 Citing the views of Toulson LJ in R (Guardian News and Media) v Westminster Magistrate’s Court [2012] EWCA Civ 
420; [2013] Q.B. 618, at [88]. 
32 [57]. 
33 Watkins v Home Office [2006] UKHL 17; [2006] 2 A.C. 395, at [26]. 
“should be the starting point where the Convention is engaged, and it will usually also be the finishing 
point.”34 And, in going on to suggest that situations where domestic law is not Convention-compliant will 
usually be matters “governed by legislation”, he implicitly acknowledged both the ability of the common 
law to develop in a fashion which achieves compliance where necessary and the greater likelihood that 
Parliament will actively seek to act incompatibly with the Convention rights than that the common law 
will be incompatible. By now making similar remarks in a Supreme Court judgment and attracting the 
agreement of a strong panel of his fellow justices, Lord Reed would appear to have put in place the 
foundations of a new approach to the interaction of domestic and human rights law.  
 
If the political movement against the HRA in recent years has lead judges to think twice before declaring 
executive action unlawful, there is considerable reason for concern. If, on the other hand, it has brought 
about a situation in which the judiciary now considers more carefully the path by which it reaches that 
conclusion and the emphasis placed upon different but perhaps complementary legal norms, then this 
would seem to be both constitutionally proper and in fact positively desirable, not least because 
clarification of this point underlines that the repeal or reform of the present system of human rights as 
implemented by the HRA is no panacea: better that those who seek such repeal understand this now than 
that they later find out that they have expended considerable political capital to little end.35 The domestic 
common law was and is a more worthy adversary than is sometimes remembered, 36 particularly in light of 
its evolution in the 1990s and particularly where the rights of prisoners are concerned. The common law 
has become more, not less, of an obstacle in the meantime, yet is not vulnerable to the full range of the 
deflection tactics employed against human rights norms. The disadvantage of a reliance upon the 
common law to protect human rights, of course, is that it is subject to statutory over-ride and therefore 
unacceptably contingent - significantly more so than the protection of human rights under the HRA, 
which is buttressed by an international dimension of a sort alien to the common law.37 Statutory override 
of the common law, though, requires a successful deployment of the political process in order to produce 
a suitably explicit statutory authority and the associated payment of what Lord Hoffman once dubbed the 
“political cost.”38 If that cost is not sufficient to prevent the legislature trampling on fundamental rights 
(or permitting the executive to do so), there remain in the law reports the infamous Jackson dicta, 
foreseeing a point at which the common law might need to develop in a fashion far more radical that 
Lord Reed here describes, so as to place limits even upon parliamentary supremacy.39 The sad truth, 
however, is that if that “political cost” is not a meaningful disincentive, the shortcoming is likely that of 
the political process rather than the law: whether relying on the common law or the HRA, there are 
inevitable limits to what the courts can do to protect rights.  
                                                          
34 Lord Reed, ‘The Interrelationship of Strasbourg and UK Human Rights Law’, speech delivered to the Scottish 
Public Law Group, Edinburgh, 18th March 2011. 
35  Human rights reform is a moving target, with new proposals emerging and fading away with considerable 
frequency. Though now out of date and unlikely to directly inform the fate of the HRA, the final report of the Bill 
of Rights Commission provides a useful overview of key issues: Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? 
The Choice Before Us (2012). 
36  The neglect of the common law has not been total: the argument, both descriptive and normative, for a 
heightened constitutional role for the common law has recently been made with renewed vigour by Trevor Allan. 
T.R.S Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
37 In particular Article 1 of the ECHR which, though not itself incorporated into domestic law, requires High 
Contracting parties to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” which are defined in 
the Convention. 
38 R v SSHD, ex parte Simms [2002] 2 AC 115, 121. 
39 Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, at [102], [104]ff., and [159]. 
